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Abstract: 
Using individual level panel data, we analyse the divergence between an unemployed individual’s reservation 
wage, as well as their expected wage, and their predicted market wage, focusing upon how job search activities 
influence the potential divergences. In addition, using propensity score matching techniques, we explore the 
implications of such divergences for future employment and wages. Our findings, which are consistent with job 
search theory, suggest that reservation wages (and expected wages) that are high relative to the predicted market 
wage influence both future employment and future wages. 
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I. Introduction and Background 
The reservation wage, the lowest wage at which an individual is willing to work, plays an 
important role in labour market theory. In particular, the reservation wage plays a key role in 
theoretical models of job search, labour supply and labour market participation (see, for 
example, Mortensen, 1986, Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999, and Pissarides, 2000). Despite the 
important theoretical role played by the reservation wage in labour market theory, there is a 
scarcity of empirical research which explores the setting of reservation wages at the individual 
level, with much of the existing literature focusing on how reservation wages affect the duration 
of unemployment, see, for example, Lancaster and Chesher (1983), Addison et al. (2008) and 
Blackaby et al. (2007). Little is known, however, about how individuals set their reservation 
wages and, in particular, about the relationship between reservation wages and the mean 
distribution of market wages. The lack of empirical research into how realistic the reservation 
wage is relative to wages prevailing in the economy is surprising: the level of the reservation 
wage relative to market wages clearly influences the probability that an individual will receive a 
‘suitable’ job offer. According to job search theory, an individual exits unemployment once 
he/she receives a wage offer equal to or in excess of the reservation wage, see, for example, 
Mortensen (1986). Hence, from a theoretical perspective, the level of the reservation wage 
relative to the market wage plays a crucial role in the transition from unemployment to 
employment.  
In this paper, we aim to redress this gap in the existing literature by focusing on the 
potential divergence between an individual’s reservation wage and their predicted market wage, 
conditioned on the individual’s characteristics such as human capital and labour market 
experience. In particular, we focus on how job search activity influences this relationship. Using 
propensity score matching techniques, we also explore the implications of such a divergence for 
future employment and wages. 
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Thus, we aim to build on the scarce empirical literature exploring the setting of 
reservation wages at the individual level. To be specific, our focus is on whether individuals’ 
reservation wages are realistic given their human capital and the prevailing economic climate. 
In addition to exploring the reservation wage, we investigate the relationship between the wages 
that unemployed individuals (and those out of the labour force) expect in a given job and the 
corresponding wages prevailing in the labour market. Hence, we conduct comparative analyses 
of the reservation wage and the expected wage. Empirical analysis of reservation wages and the 
expected wages of unemployed individuals and those currently out of the labour market will 
shed light on whether such individuals have realistic labour market aspirations and how job 
search activities shape such aspirations and expectations.  
II. Data 
Our empirical analysis is based on panel data drawn from the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS). The BHPS is a random sample survey, carried out by the Institute for Social and 
Economic Research, of each adult member from a nationally representative sample of more 
than 5,000 private households (yielding approximately 10,000 individual interviews). For wave 
one, interviews were conducted during the autumn of 1991. The same individuals are re-
interviewed in successive waves – the latest available being wave fifteen, collected in 2005. 
Our empirical analysis is, however, restricted to waves 6 to 15 given data availability relating to 
key variables, which provide information on job search activities.1
  The defining feature of the BHPS for our empirical analysis is that if the respondent ‘is 
not currently working but has looked for work in the last week or last four weeks or has not 
looked for work in the last week or last four weeks but would like a job’, he/she is asked to 
                                                 
1 Our period of study coincides with the introduction of the Job Seekers Allowance in the UK, which tightened the 
job search requirements for benefit eligibility. As detailed by Manning (2005), all claimants had to sign a Job 
Seeker’s Agreement indicating: the type of job sought; when the claimant is able to work; and the steps taken to 
identify and apply for jobs.  
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specify: ‘what is the lowest weekly take home pay you would consider accepting for a job?’2 In 
addition, unemployed individuals and those out of the labour market are asked: ‘are you looking 
for a particular kind of job or any sort of job you can find?’ If individuals indicate that they are 
looking for a particular kind of job then they are asked: ‘what sort of job are you looking for? 
Could you give me a possible job title and describe the sort of work you will be doing?’ The 
respondents are then asked: ‘what weekly take home pay would you expect to get for that job?’ 
Hence, responses to the first question reveal the reservation wage, whilst responses to the last 
question yield information pertaining to expected wages.3,4 We analyse an unbalanced panel of 
data which comprises 6,202 (5,431) individuals when focusing upon the reservation (expected) 
wage,5 where the maximum number of times an individual can be in the sample is 10 years, the 
minimum is 1 year and the average is 2 years. Furthermore, we are able to distinguish between 
those who are unemployed and those individuals who are out of the labour market by the 
individual’s response to questions about their current economic status: 59% of our sample is 
reported to be out of the labour market.6
                                                 
2 Given the reference to ‘weekly take home pay’ in the question, it seems reasonable to assume that respondents 
would refer to the net (i.e. after tax) wage. Hence, throughout the forthcoming analysis we focus on weekly net 
pay. We have also conducted the analysis based on hourly pay, the results of which are available on request. 
3 Hofler and Murphy (1994), who use stochastic frontier techniques to estimate reservation wages for a sample of 
employed individuals, argue that the reservation wages declared by individuals in surveys may be measured 
inaccurately. For example, individuals may not be well-informed enough to provide an accurate answer or it may 
be difficult to factor in non-wage characteristics of jobs, which may entice individuals into accepting job offers. 
However, this is at odds with evidence provided by Dominitz (1998) and Hogan (2004) where subjective measures 
of earnings are, on average, found to be relatively accurate. 
4 The reservation wage and the expected wage are highly correlated at 0.89, which is statistically significant at the 
1 per cent level. Gorter and Gorter (1983) in their analysis of the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel, 1985 to 1987, 
report 44.17% of total observations where the reservation wage equals the expected wage. In the BHPS, for our 
sample of individuals who are unemployed or out of the labour market, 7.9% specify a reservation wage equal to 
the expected wage (8.4% for the unemployed and 5.9% for those out of the labour market). Hence, in contrast to 
the findings of Gorter and Gorter (1983), this suggests that individuals do distinguish between the two concepts. 
5 The sample size is smaller for the expected wage due to the question routing of the BHPS where individuals are 
only asked about their expected wage if they give a specific job title (see above). 
6 We define being out of the labour market as: maternity/ paternity leave; family care; full time student; long term 
sick or disabled; government training scheme; and other unspecified non labour force activity. We have also 
conducted our analysis on a restricted sample of unemployed individuals. The key results, which for brevity are not 
reported here, accord with those based on the larger sample containing the unemployed and those classified as out 
of the labour market. 
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We compare both the reservation wage ( ) and expected wage ( ) with 
individuals’ predicted wages, , which are based upon the predicted wages for individuals 
who are unemployed or out of the labour market, U. This is constructed following Hogan 
(2004) and Prasad (2003), by estimating a standard wage equation for employees who have less 
than one year of current firm tenure. Tenure is restricted to one year or less since the wages of 
these employees are more likely to reflect current labour market conditions than if all 
employees, regardless of tenure, were used. The wage equation is estimated as a semi log model 
where  represents the wage of employees, E,  is a vector of employee characteristics,
itrw itew
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and itν  is a random error term, 2~ IN(0, )it itν σ : 
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The estimated coefficients γˆ  are then used to predict a wage for each individual who is 
unemployed or out of the labour market based upon their characteristics, ( ), as 
shown in equation (1). Figure 1 presents the distributions of the logarithm of the reservation 
wage, the logarithm of the expected wage, and the logarithm of the predicted market wage, 
where each wage distribution appears normally distributed and the mean of the predicted 
market wage is lower than that of either the reservation wage or the expected wage.
U
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U
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7 We control for sample selection into employment by including an inverse mills ratio term in the wage equation. 
Covariates included in the wage equation are: gender, a quadratic in age; highest educational attainment; ethnicity; 
marital status; and regional and year controls. The over-identifying instruments used to control for sample selection 
bias are: whether the respondent has any dependent children aged less than 5; whether the respondent has any 
dependent children aged 5-16; and whether the respondent’s partner is the primary child carer. The estimated wage 
equation accords with the existing literature with, for example, a positive estimated relationship between education 
and earnings and a concave relationship between earnings and age. 
8 We have also compared the reservation wage and the expected wage to actual wages calculated from the Labour 
Force Survey (LFS) and also the New Earnings Survey (NES). We calculate average wages for each occupation for 
each year in each region from both the LFS and NES. We then compare the individual’s reservation wage, as well 
as the wage that the individual expects to receive in this particular occupation, with the average regional wage that 
individuals in employment actually receive in this occupation. The correlation between the LFS or NES net wage 
and the predicted net wage from the BHPS is around 0.55 and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The 
empirical findings which follow are generally consistent with this alternative definition of the market wage. 
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III. Reservation Wages, Expected Wages and Market Wages 
Focusing on the sample of unemployed individuals and those out of the labour market, we 
firstly explore the relationship between individual i’s reservation wage at time period t ( ) 
and their predicted wage at time t ( ) by specifying a multinomial logit model as follows: 
itrw
itwˆ
( )
( ) ( )
( )
1 1
ˆ0 1
ˆ ˆ1 1 , 1
ˆ2 1
it it
it it it it it it it
it it
if rw w d
P if rw w d w d X JS
if rw w d
β λ ε
⎧ > −⎪ ′⎡ ⎤= ∈ − + = +⎨ ⎣ ⎦⎪ < +⎩
+     (2) 
where (d×100) represents the percentage point differential between  and . To be 
specific,  equals 1 if  lies within plus or minus (d×100) % of  where we explore three 
differentials: 3%, 5% and 10% to see whether the extent of the differential is important, i.e. 
,  and , respectively. In our sample, 63.2%, 62% and 59.1% of 
individuals have a reservation wage which lies within plus or minus 3%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively, of the predicted market wage, whilst the corresponding figures for the expected 
wage are 59.3%, 58.1% and 54.9%. In addition, 
itrw itwˆ
itP itrw itwˆ
0.03d = 0.05d = 0.10d =
itX  is a vector of individual characteristics 
(time varying and non time varying) and  is a random error term, itε
2~ IN(0, )it itε σ . We repeat 
our analysis replacing  with , the expected wage of individual i in time period t. Our 
focus is on a categorical variable in order to define the treatment in the propensity score 
matching analysis presented in Section IV. 
itrw itew
The explanatory variables in equation (2), denoted by the vector itX ,  include: gender; 
ethnicity; aged 25 to 34; aged 35 to 44; aged 45 to 54; aged 55 to 65 (with aged 18 to 24 as the 
omitted category); number of children; number of individuals in the household; married or 
cohabiting; highest educational attainment (first or higher degree, teaching or nursing, A levels 
and GCSE, with no education as the omitted category); the logarithm of household labour 
income; the logarithm of household asset income; the logarithm of household benefit income; 
following Falk et al. (2006), the logarithm of the wage in the previous or last job, which is set 
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to zero if there is no previous job; the logarithm of monthly rent or mortgage repayments to 
proxy housing costs; the regional unemployment rate, which is included to control for regional 
differences in the job offer distribution; whether the respondent is currently out of the labour 
market; and a quadratic in the number of years in unemployment or out of the labour market.  
In addition, our empirical analysis is focused on waves 6 to 15 of the BHPS, since these 
waves provide detailed information on an unemployed individual’s job search activities, which 
we control for since such activities may influence the reservation wage and the expected wage. 
For example, Lancaster and Chesher (1983) argue that the reservation wages of unemployed job 
seekers are influenced by their knowledge of the wage offer distribution as well as job 
availability. It is apparent that job search may serve to inform individuals about the wage offer 
distribution. We define job search intensity ( ) as an index of whether they have over the 
past four weeks: applied directly to an employer; studied or replied to an advertisement; 
contacted a private employment agency or job centre; asked friends or contacts; or taken steps 
to set up a business. The index takes the maximum value of five if the individual has carried out 
all such job search activities. Thus, the BHPS provides an opportunity to explore the 
implications of differences in job search activity for the setting of reservation wages.
itJS
9  
Summary statistics for the explanatory variables are presented in Table 1 Panel A, 
where on average individuals undertake one form of job search and have been unemployed or 
out of the labour market for 5 years.10 We also report summary statistics for the job search 
variable across the unemployed and out of the labour market samples separately, as presented in 
Table 1 Panels B and C. It is apparent that job search activity is higher for those individuals 
who have greater labour market attachment, i.e. the unemployed, who undertake, on average, 
two types of job search. 
                                                 
9 Although our focus lies on analysing the effect of the pre treatment covariates in equation (2), rather than on 
identifying causal relationships, it is important to acknowledge the potential for reverse causality with some of the 
covariates. 
10 All monetary variables have been deflated with 2005 as the base year. 
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Results 
The results of estimating equation (2) are presented in Table 2, which is split into two columns, 
the first column reports the results relating to the reservation wage being within plus or minus 
(d×100) % of the predicted market wage, i.e. 1itP = , whilst the second column presents the 
results where the reservation wage is less than (d×100) % of the predicted wage, i.e. 2itP = . 
The table is split into six panels: In Panels A, B and C, we present marginal effects relating to: 
the probability that an individual reports a reservation wage within plus or minus (d×100) % of 
his/her predicted wage (i.e. the ‘same’ category in Table 2); and the probability that the 
individual reports a reservation wage below their predicted market wage. In Panel A, 0.03d = , 
i.e. a 3% differential, in Panel B , and in Panel C 0.05d = 0.10d = . Panels D, E and F replicate 
the analysis of Panels A to C but focus on the expected wage rather than the reservation wage. 
Panel A reports the full set of marginal effects, whilst Panels B to F, for reasons of brevity, 
focus explicitly upon the marginal effects of whether the individual is out of the labour market 
and job search activity. Throughout Table 2, the base category is 0itP = , the case where the 
reservation or expected wage exceeds the predicted market wage. 
 Focusing on Panel A, factors which are positively associated with the probability that an 
individual reports a reservation wage below the predicted market wage include: being male; all 
age categories relative to the youngest age category, 18-24 year olds; the number of children; 
marital status; wage in previous employment; household monthly mortgage/rental costs; and 
years of the current labour market spell (albeit at a decreasing rate). Conversely, factors which 
are inversely associated with the probability of ( )ˆ 1it itrw w d< + , where , include: 
household size; having A levels relative to no education; and whether the respondent is out of 
the labour market relative to being unemployed. The latter effect is relatively large associated 
with a decrease in the probability that the reservation wage is more than 3% below the predicted 
market wage by 6.3 percentage points. We find that the effects of benefit income and income 
0.03d =
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from assets are statistically insignificant. Interestingly, there is little role for human capital 
operating through educational attainment rather it would appear that such effects are captured 
by the individual’s age and length of current labour market spell.11 Turning to job search 
activity, the index of job search intensity is positively associated with the probability that the 
reservation wage is below the predicted market wage. Based upon the mean of the job search 
intensity index, job search is associated with an increase in the probability that the reservation 
wage is 3% below the predicted market wage of 1.22 percentage points, relative to individuals 
who have a reservation wage which exceeds the predicted market wage.12
 In Panels B and C, where 0.05d =  and 0.10d =  respectively, individuals out of the 
labour market are less likely to have a reservation wage either equal to or below the predicted 
wage. Job search is clearly important in explaining the probability of the reservation wage being 
equal to or below the predicted market wage. For the category where reservation wages are 
below the predicted wage, the influence of job search is relatively stable across the three values 
of d. Panels D, E and F summarise the results relating to the expected wage and the predicted 
wage, where noticeably for the ‘below’ category the magnitude of the influence of the job 
search index is larger and relatively stable across the values of d. For example, focusing on 
Panel D, based upon mean job search intensity the probability that the expected wage is below 
the predicted market wage increases by 6.2 percentage points. Hence, on average, it would 
appear that job search is associated with more realistic wage aspirations, i.e. not overly high. 
Across Panels D to E, being out of the labour market is associated with around a 28 percentage 
                                                 
11 If we exclude the duration of the current labour market spell then the educational effects become statistically 
significant, and lower the probability of having a reservation wage (d×100) % below the offered market wage. 
12 Note job search has no influence on the probability that the reservation wage is within 3% of the predicted wage. 
It is possible that those with high job search exit unemployment relatively quickly which might influence the 
reservation wage. Hence, we have explored this further by interacting the job search index with the duration of 
unemployment. Such interactions were always insignificant. Hui (1991), exploring youth unemployment in 
Australia, finds that individuals, who engaged in intensive job search, as proxied by the number of job search 
methods used, experienced a relatively shorter duration of unemployment, although the number of search methods 
was found to be statistically insignificant in the reservation wage equation. 
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point decrease in the probability that the expected wage is below the predicted market wage, 
relative to having an expected wage in excess of the predicted wage.13  
 Although our focus lies on the categorical variable defined in equation (2), in order to 
define the treatment, we explore the robustness of the results presented in Table 2 by analysing 
the difference between the reservation wage and predicted market wage as a continuous 
variable:  if ( )ˆln lnit it itd rw w= − ˆ 0it itrw w− > , and ( ) ( )ˆln 1 lnit it itd rw= − −w
                                                
 if  . 
If  lies between zero and unity,  is set to zero. We explore the determinants of 
 by employing a quantile regression approach, which provides a full characterisation of the 
conditional distribution. Thus, instead of assuming that covariates shift only the location or the 
scale of the conditional distribution, quantile regression analysis explores the potential effects 
of the covariates on the shape of the distribution. The results presented in Table 3 show the 
effect of the covariates across each decile of the conditional distribution, where in Panel A (B) 
the focus is on the difference between the reservation wage (expected wage) and the predicted 
market wage. It is apparent in Panel A that both age and education are inversely associated with 
the size of the difference at the bottom end of the distribution. Noticeably, in contrast to the 
MNL results, there is no role for length of time out of employment with human capital effects 
operating through educational attainment. In accordance with the results in Table 2, job search 
activity (being out of the labour force) is positively (negatively) associated with the difference 
between the reservation wage, as well as the expected wage, and the predicted market wage, 
where the effects are larger below the median. 
ˆ 0it itrw w− <
ˆit itrw w− ln itd
ln itd
 
 
 
13 To investigate the robustness of our results, we re-estimate equation (2) as a generalized ordered logit model, see 
Williams (2006), which is advantageous over a standard ordered logit approach in that the cut-off points are 
allowed to vary between individuals. This allows covariates to have a different influence upon the odds that the 
outcome is above a particular threshold. Our results, which are available on request, are robust to this alternative 
modelling approach. 
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IV. Reservation Wages, Expected Wages, Future Employment and Wages 
A principal advantage of the BHPS is that the reservation wage information is available over 
time and the panel nature of the data means that we can trace individuals and their subsequent 
labour market experiences over time to explore whether unrealistic wage aspirations influence 
subsequent employment outcomes and wages. One might predict that if the individual has a 
relatively high (or even unrealistic) reservation wage, the probability of exiting unemployment, 
will be relatively low. Hence, we analyse the effect of an individual having a reservation wage 
less than the predicted market wage at time t on the probability of being employed in time 
period t+1. We also repeat the analysis replacing the reservation wage with the expected wage. 
Out of our sample of individuals who are unemployed or out of the labour market at time period 
t, 22.4% (i.e. 1,390 individuals) are either employed or self employed in the next year. Table 1 
Panel D presents summary statistics relating to the sample of individuals who secure 
employment or become self-employed in t+1 relating to the net weekly wage in t+1, 1itw + , the 
log reservation wage at time t and the log expected wage at time t. The correlation between 
 and  ( ) is 0.48 (0.53), which is statistically significant at the 1% level. Frijters and 
Van der Klauuw (2006) report a correlation coefficient between reservation wages and post-
employment wages in the German Socio-Economic Panel of 0.58 and argue that the observed 
reservation wage is a good indicator of labour market prospects (in their sample in 16% of 
cases, the observed reservation wage exceeds the post-unemployment wage).  In our sample of 
individuals drawn from the BHPS, however, out of the sample of individuals who find 
employment, 62.5% of individuals end up with a wage in t+1, which is below their reservation 
wage in t. The corresponding figure for expected wages is 56.1%.
1itw + itrw itew
14 This is interesting in that 
labour market theory suggests that individuals will not exit unemployment unless the post-
                                                 
14 There are significant differences between those unemployed and not in the labour market at time t. Of those not 
in the labour market at time t around 70-75% have a reservation (expected) wage below the wage they receive 
when employed at t+1. 
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unemployment market wage exceeds the reservation wage, see, for example Mortensen (1986). 
One possible explanation for this finding might be the change in government policy in the 
British labour market relating to a tightening of job search requirements in order to receive 
benefits with the introduction of the Job Seekers Allowance. 
 In order to ascertain the effect of ( )ˆ 1it itrw w d< +  on the probability of future 
employment, we use the method of propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). 
Propensity score matching methods have only become popular in economics over the last 
decade or so, the most common application being the analysis of labour market programmes 
(e.g. Heckman et al., 1997, and Hotz et al., 1999). Similarly, Jalan and Ravallion (2003) 
analyse an anti-poverty programme in Argentina using propensity score matching methods and 
Brown and Pudney (2005) apply propensity score matching techniques to ascertain the effect of 
under-employment on poverty. Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), the propensity score 
( ps ) is defined as the probability of receiving a treatment conditional on pre-treatment 
characteristics: 
( ) ( ) (1i i i i )ips X prob P X E P X= = =        (3) 
where  is a binary dummy which indicates exposure to treatment, defined from equation (2) if 
equal to outcome 2, i.e. , and  is a vector of pre-treatment covariates. 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that the average effect of the treatment on the treated 
(ATT), given by 
P
(ˆ 1it itrw w d< + ) X
δ , can be estimated as follows: 
{ } ( )( ) ( ){ }1 0 1 01 1, 0,i i i i i i i i i iE Y Y P E E Y P ps X E Y P ps X Pδ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡= − = = = − = =⎣⎣ ⎦ 1⎤⎦   (4) 
where the outer expectation is over the distribution of ( ){ }1i ips Z P = , and  and  denote 
the potential outcomes in the two states of treatment (T) and no treatment, i.e. control (C), 
respectively, hence 
1iY 0iY
T Cδ = − . 
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In our application, the treatment is defined as having ( )ˆ 1it itrw w d< +  and the outcome 
we initially consider is whether the individual is employed at t+1. Propensity score matching 
techniques allow us to ascertain the average effect of treatment, i.e. , on those 
who are characterised by , i.e. the average effect of treatment on the treated 
(ATT). Hence, we can ascertain whether the employment rate in t+1 of those with relatively low 
reservation wages in t is significantly different than that of the matched control group members. 
The second outcome of interest is the net weekly wage of employees at t+1, thereby allowing us 
to explore whether having a relatively low reservation wage at time t is associated with a higher 
actual wage in t+1. The main advantage of this approach over traditional sample selection 
approaches is that it is essentially non-parametric, i.e. this approach does not impose a 
particular functional form. To explore the robustness of our findings, we use three alternative 
matching methods: kernel matching (using the Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 0.06); 
radius matching (with a radius of 0.1); and nearest neighbour matching (with a random draw 
used to resolve ties), see Cochran and Rubin (1973) and Heckman et al. (1997) for further 
details of these methods.
(ˆ 1it itrw w d< + )
)
                                                
(ˆ 1it itrw w d< +
15
Results 
Table 4 presents the results of the propensity score matching analysis where the outcome is 
subsequent employment in t+1, whilst Table 5 focuses upon the net weekly wage outcome of 
employees at t+1. In each table there are six rows, i.e. Panels A to C relate to the reservation 
wage compared to the predicted market wage. In Panels D to F of both tables, the analogous 
comparisons are made with respect to expected wages rather than reservation wages. Both 
tables are split into three columns, where T statistics from the kernel, radius and nearest 
 
15 We implement the routine ‘PSMATCH2’ in STATA developed by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). Our results are 
based upon standard errors, which have not been derived through bootstrapping due to the recent concern in the 
literature over the use of bootstrapping for matching estimators, see Abadie and Imbens (2006). 
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neighbour matching techniques respectively are presented in each column. The unmatched 
difference is shown along with the ATT. 
Across the different matching methods the ATT is generally statistically significant for 
both employment and wage outcomes, see Tables 4 and 5 respectively. In terms of the ATT for 
employment at t+1 there is evidence of a positive effect in the range of 2% to 4% when 
compared to matched control group members. Thus, in accordance with job search theory, 
having lower reservation wages increases the likelihood of employment in t+1, and the effect 
increases monotonically with d. Similarly, for expected wages, having an expected wage lower 
than the predicted wage increases the probability of subsequent employment by between 6% 
and 8.5%.  
Turning to the wage outcomes in Table 5, the ATT is always positive and the evidence 
suggests that net weekly wages are between £29-£34 and £28-£36 higher when compared to the 
matched control group for reservation and expected wages respectively. Thus, having a 
reservation wage or expected wage lower than the predicted wage at time t is associated with 
actually receiving a higher wage from subsequent employment compared to the control group. 
In order to shed further light on the type of employment at t+1, Table 6 presents a cross-
tabulation between the occupation that the individual was seeking employment in at time period 
t, sitocc , and the actual occupation where he/she found employment at t+1, , based upon a 
sub-sample of those reporting that they are looking for a specific occupation at t and who 
indicate employment in a specific occupation at t+1. There are 1,108 individuals who provide 
information about the occupation sought at time t and actual occupation of employment at time 
t+1. Focusing upon the lead diagonal, it is apparent that a significant proportion of individuals, 
approximately 51%, match into the occupation they were seeking employment in. The highest 
proportion of accurate matches are for craft and related occupations where 67% of individuals 
seeking employment in this occupation at time t secured employment in this occupation at t+1. 
1
a
itocc +
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Interestingly, over 21% (27.1%) of those in employment end up employed in a lower (higher) 
occupational group than that sought, i.e. above (below) the lead diagonal  
( ).
1
a s
it itocc occ+ >
1
a s
it itocc occ+ < 16  
In Table 7 we explore the relationship between reservation wages at t, occupational 
status at t+1 and wages at t+1. Table 7 is split into four panels reporting the proportion of 
individuals who are above (column 1) or below (column 2) the lead diagonal in Table 6 for 
those individuals where the reservation wage is below the predicted wage for  and 
.
0.05d =
0.10d = 17 The analysis is repeated for expected wages. Clearly, a higher proportion of 
individuals are employed in occupational groups higher than expected, , rather 
than jobs of a lower occupational classification. This is the case for both reservation wages and 
expected wages across the different comparison groups.  
1
a
it itocc occ+ < s
In sum, in accordance with job search theory, those individuals with reservation or 
expected wages below their predicted market wage are characterised by a statistically 
significant higher probability of future employment. Furthermore, these individuals are likely to 
receive higher net weekly wages than their matched counterparts, which can be partly explained 
by occupational attainment, i.e. actual occupational status in t+1 is, on average, higher than that 
expected at t for this group of individuals. We investigate this further by redefining the 
treatment in equations (3) and (4) as: ( ) ( )( )1 ˆ 1a sit it it itP occ occ rw w d+⎡ ⎤= < × < +⎣ ⎦  or 
, where ( ) ( )( )1 ˆ 1a sit it it itP occ occ ew w d+⎡ ⎤⎦= < × < +⎣ ( )0,1P∈
s
                                                
 and the outcome as wages. The ATT 
is shown in each panel and is always significant across d where occupational attainment is 
higher than expected, , i.e. such individuals receive higher weekly net wages than 1
a
it itocc occ+ <
 
16 For both occupation sought and actual occupation obtained the occupational codes run from 1 to 9. The analysis 
which follows is based on a ranking of occupational groups, see, for example, Mayhew and Rosewell (1981) and 
Greenhalgh and Stewart (1985), which reflects the associated skill levels or arguably wages. Interestingly wages 
decrease monotonically across occupational categories 1 through to 9. 
17 Note there are no individuals at d = 0.03, i.e. 3% differential, and  or . 1
a s
it itocc occ+ < 1a sit itocc occ+ >
 16
their matched counterparts, and the ATT is insignificant if the individual is employed in a lower 
occupation than predicted.18
V. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have explored the determinants and the implications of divergences between 
an individual’s reservation wage and his/her predicted market wage. We have focused on how 
job search influences divergences between an individual’s reservation, as well as expected, 
wage and their predicted market wage. Job search activity is found to influence the probability 
of having a reservation wage lower than the predicted wage. Furthermore, using propensity 
score matching techniques, in accordance with job search theory we find that individuals, who 
are unemployed or out of the labour market and have a reservation wage which is below their 
predicted wage, have a higher probability of future employment and subsequently higher wages. 
Given the important role played by reservation, as well as expected, wages in future 
employment, earnings and occupational attainment, as highlighted by our empirical analysis, 
further research in this area should be of particular interest to policy makers. In particular, our 
findings suggest that job search activity has an important moderating influence on the 
probability that the reservation wage, or expected wage, exceeds the predicted market wage. 
Policies aimed at encouraging job search activity may serve to inform job seekers about the 
prevailing wage offer distribution and, hence, may lead to realistic labour market aspirations 
and expectations. 
                                                 
18 Note that the ATT is based upon Kernel matching. Alternative matching criteria yielded similar results and are 
omitted for brevity. 
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Figure 1: The Distributions of Log Reservation Wages, Log Expected Wages and Log Predicted Wages 
 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics  
PANEL A MEAN. STD.DEV MIN. MAX 
Log Reservation Wage, ( )ln itrw  4.6456 0.7545 0 9.1049
Log Expected Wage, # ( )ln itew 4.6004 0.7506 0 8.8441
Log Predicted Wage,  ( )ˆln itw 4.4715 0.4801 3.0758 5.8142
Employed  in Next Period t+1 0.1371 0.3440 0 1
Male  0.4403 0.4965 0 1
White  0.4268 0.4947 0 1
Aged 25 to 34  0.2615 0.4395 0 1
Aged 35 to 44  0.2209 0.4149 0 1
Aged 45 to 54  0.1659 0.3720 0 1
Aged 55+  0.0808 0.2725 0 1
Number of Children 0.9805 1.1774 0 8
Household Size 3.1809 1.2782 1 5
Married/ Cohabiting  0.5472 0.4978 0 1
Degree (First or Higher)  0.0761 0.2652 0 1
Teaching or Nursing  0.1696 0.3752 0 1
A Levels  0.1506 0.3577 0 1
GCSE  0.2078 0.4058 0 1
Log Household Labour Income  6.0258 4.3927 0 12.2056
Log Household Asset Income 1.8947 2.7899 0 10.5648
Log Household Benefit Income 6.9453 2.9186 0 9.2584
Log Wage in Previous Employment 1.9838 2.9633 0 9.2584
Log Household Monthly Mortgage/Rent Costs 4.3233 2.0265 0 9.7289
Years of Current Economic Status 5.0002 8.7658 0 53
Years of Current Economic Status Squared 101.8281 316.1872 0 2809
Regional Unemployment Rate 6.0139 1.4464 3.3 11.1
Out of Labour Market  0.5855 0.4927 0 1
Index of Job Search Intensity  1.1777 1.5383 0 5
OBSERVATIONS 6,202 
PANEL B: UNEMPLOYED MEAN. STD.DEV MIN. MAX 
Index of Job Search Intensity 2.1661 1.6016 0 5
OBSERVATIONS 2,571 
PANEL C: OUT OF THE LABOUR MARKET MEAN. STD.DEV MIN. MAX 
Index of Job Search Intensity  0.4778 1.0221 0 5
OBSERVATIONS 3,631 
Note: # based upon a sub-sample of 5,431 observations due to missing observations. 
 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics – Continued 
PANEL D: EMPLOYED t+1 MEAN. STD.DEV MIN. MAX 
Log Net Wage, ( )1ln itw +  4.6763 0.7083 1.8606 7.1763 
Log Reservation Wage, ( )ln itrw  4.7761 0.7347 1.0986 6.9078 
Log Expected Wage,  ( )ln itew 4.7478 0.7161 3.2871 5.6585 
( )1it itw rw+ ≥  0.3752 0.4843 0 1 
( )1it itw ew+ ≥  0.4390 0.4964 0 1 
OBSERVATIONS 1,390 
 Table 2: Reservation Wages and Expected Wages Relative to Predicted Wages (MNL) 
PANEL A: , PROBABILITY = ˆ it itw rw− SAME BELOW 
( ) 0.03d = M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT 
Male 0.0230 (4.14) 0.1804 (13.00) 
White -0.0014 (0.30) -0.0066 (0.59) 
Age 25 to 34 0.0144 (1.37) 0.0593 (3.14) 
Age 35 to 44 0.0241 (1.92) 0.1126 (4.91) 
Age 45 to 54 0.0212 (1.49) 0.1337 (5.11) 
Age 55+ 0.0363 (1.70) 0.1169 (3.40) 
Number of Children -0.0012 (0.33) 0.0334 (4.06) 
Household Size -0.0065 (0.22) -0.0190 (2.91) 
Married/ Cohabiting -0.0020 (0.33) 0.0236 (2.03) 
Degree (First or Higher) -0.0048 (0.50) -0.0167 (0.81) 
Teaching or Nursing  0.0030 (0.50) 0.0133 (0.86) 
A Levels -0.0018 (0.26) -0.0387 (2.64) 
GCSE -0.0050 (0.88) -0.0024 (0.17) 
Log Household Labour Income  -0.0002 (0.25) -0.0043 (2.69) 
Log Household Asset Income -0.0005 (0.45) -0.0027 (1.21) 
Log Household Benefit Income 0.0011 (1.14) 0.0006 (0.30) 
Log Wage in Previous Employment 0.0006 (0.60) 0.0074 (3.32) 
Log Household Monthly Mortgage/Rent Costs 0.0001 (0.08) 0.0052 (1.96) 
Years of Current Economic Status 0.0004 (0.53) 0.0041 (1.99) 
Years of Current Economic Status Squared -0.0001 (0.76) -0.0001 (2.12) 
Regional Unemployment Rate 0.0025 (1.69) 0.0002 (0.07) 
Out of Labour Market -0.0183 (3.09) -0.0630 (4.71) 
Index of Job Search Intensity 0.0013 (0.79) 0.0104 (2.86) 
Wald chi squared (46) 561.20  p=[0.000] 
PANEL B: , PROBABILITY = ˆ it itw rw− SAME BELOW 
( ) 0.05d = M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT 
Out of Labour Market -0.0262 (3.32) -0.0554 (4.20) 
Index of Job Search Intensity 0.0037 (1.61) 0.0101 (2.84) 
Wald chi squared (46) 568.46  p=[0.000] 
PANEL C: , PROBABILITY = ˆ it itw rw− SAME BELOW 
( ) 0.10d = M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT 
Out of Labour Market -0.0605 (5.27) -0.0425 (3.56) 
Index of Job Search Intensity 0.0090 (2.90) 0.0099 (3.02) 
Wald chi squared (46) 662.82  p=[0.000] 
PANEL D: , PROBABILITY = ˆ it itw ew− SAME BELOW 
( ) 0.03d = M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT 
Out of Labour Market 0.0088 (2.99) -0.2808 (13.39) 
Index of Job Search Intensity 0.0014 (3.07) 0.0525 (8.41) 
Wald chi squared (46) 743.82  p=[0.000] 
PANEL E: , PROBABILITY = ˆ it itw ew− SAME BELOW 
( ) 0.05d = M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT 
Out of Labour Market 0.0054 (4.75) -0.2810 (13.85) 
Index of Job Search Intensity -0.0002 (3.08) 0.0537 (8.53) 
Wald chi squared (46) 742.69  p=[0.000] 
PANEL F: , PROBABILITY = ˆ it itw ew− SAME BELOW 
( ) 0.10=d M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT 
Out of Labour Market 0.0123 (6.79) -0.2849 (14.32) 
Index of Job Search Intensity 0.0003 (4.50) 0.0526 (8.60) 
Wald chi squared (46) 756.61  p=[0.000] 
OBSERVATIONS PANELS A-C=6,202;   D-F=5,431 
Table 3: Quantile Regression Analysis of the Difference between Reservation Wages, Expected Wages, and Predicted Wages  
 DECILE 
PANEL A:  ˆit itrw w− 10                20 30 40   50 60 70 80 90
    COEF COEF COEF COEF COEFCOEF COEF COEF COEF
Intercept -1.8911 * 2.0449 * 2.6827 * 2.8296 * 2.6468 * 3.5829 * 4.1041 * 4.4711 * 4.7683 * 
Male -0.7131 * -0.6712 * -0.4192 * -0.3137 * -0.0410  0.1616 * 0.2347 * 0.2262 * 0.1973 * 
White 0.0858  0.0320  0.1180  0.1520 * 0.0457  0.0462  -0.0290  0.0134  0.0064  
Age 25 to 34 -0.6391 * -0.4434 * -0.2840 * -0.2032  0.0263  0.0155  -0.0060  -0.0257  0.0249  
Age 35 to 44 -0.7223 * -0.7030 * -0.4901 * -0.4177 * -0.1496  -0.0419  0.0908  0.1517 * 0.1935 * 
Age 45 to 54 -0.5116 * -0.4201 * -0.1302 * 0.1536  0.4145 * 0.2382 * 0.2455 * 0.2683 * 0.2713 * 
Age 55+ 0.1408  0.5861 * 0.6387 * 0.9076 * 1.1669 * 0.6228 * 0.5672 * 0.5060 * 0.4519 * 
Number of Children -0.0072  0.0035  0.0143  0.0070  0.0397  0.0093  0.0252  0.0379 * 0.0362  
Household Size -0.0001  0.1102 * 0.0457  0.1439 * 0.1481 * 0.0840 * 0.0443  0.0055  -0.0158  
Married/ Cohabiting -0.3506 * -0.4324 * -0.4352  -0.4620 * -0.5365 * -0.3480 * -0.3204  -0.2240 * -0.1508 * 
Degree (First or Higher) -1.2637 * -2.0090 * -1.7585 * -1.5696 * -0.6006 * -0.1009  0.2236 * 0.4523 * 0.4973 * 
Teaching or Nursing  -1.0154 * -1.4488 * -1.5005 * -1.5414 * -0.9432 * -0.2634 * -0.0338  0.0457  0.1496 * 
A Levels -0.9126 * -1.3361 * -1.3562 * -1.7723 * 2.6284 * -1.1507 * -0.6095 * -0.2937 * -0.0933  
GCSE -0.4215 * -0.6000 * -0.5093 * -0.3373 * -0.0759  -0.0195  -0.0089  0.0213  0.0413  
Log Household Labour Income  -0.0021  -0.0343 * -0.0439 * -0.1240 * -0.1103 * -0.0617 * -0.0427 * -0.3069 * -0.0195 * 
Log Household Asset Income -0.0223 * -0.0320 * -0.0423 * -0.0668 * -0.1050 * -0.0567 * -0.0331 * -0.0274 * -0.0154  
Log Household Benefit Income 0.0368 * 0.0582 * 0.0791 * 0.1233 * 0.1389 * 0.0855 * 0.0434 * 0.0257 * 0.0142  
Log Wage in Previous Employment 0.0267 * 0.0845 * 0.0872 * 0.1708 * 0.1700 * 0.1022 * 0.0685 * 0.0489 * 0.0312 * 
Log Household Monthly Mortgage/Rent Costs -0.0001  -0.0037  -0.0071  0.0027  -0.0037  -0.0182  0.0006  0.0022  0.0081  
Years of Current Economic Status -0.0019  0.0051  -0.0169  -0.0242  -0.0124  0.0101  0.0014  0.0056  0.0044  
Years of Current Economic Status Squared -0.0001  -0.0002  0.0003  0.0006  0.0003  -0.0002  -0.0001  -0.0003  -0.0003  
Regional Unemployment Rate 0.0633 * 0.0317 * 0.0502 * 0.0542 * 0.0640 * 0.0011  -0.0198  -0.0305 * -0.0335 * 
Out of Labour Market -1.3158 * -4.5538 * -4.9025 * -4.0292 * -2.1111 * -0.9907 * -0.5193 * -0.2862 * -0.1421 * 
Index of Job Search Intensity 0.1481 * 0.3261 * 0.2612 * 0.2366 * 0.1909 * 0.1073 * 0.0721 * 0.0501 * 0.0287  
Pseudo R Squared 0.0838 0.1686 0.2523 0.2215 0.1260 0.0696 0.0450 0.0304  0.0218  
OBSERVATIONS 6,202 
 DECILE 
PANEL B:  ˆit itew w− 10                20 30 40   50 60 70 80 90
    COEF COEF COEF COEF COEFCOEF COEF COEF COEF
Out of Labour Market -0.8694 * -2.6955 * -4.9714 * -5.7386 * -5.6901 * -4.2303 * -1.3925 * -0.7004 * -0.3393 * 
Index of Job Search Intensity 0.6534 * 0.6434 * 0.4548 * 0.3119 * 0.2506 * 0.2788 * 0.1551 * 0.1109 * 0.0535 * 
Pseudo R Squared 0.0527 0.0871 0.1595 0.2403 0.2481 0.1386 0.0675 0.0400  0.0285  
OBSERVATIONS 5,431 
Note: * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. 
 
TREATMENT KERNEL   RADIUS NEIGHBOUR
 
SAMPLE 
ˆ T Cδ = −  TSTAT ˆ T Cδ = −  TSTAT ˆ T Cδ = −  TSTAT 
PANEL A: ( )ˆ 1it itrw w d< + , 0.03d =  Unmatched  0.03657 (2.8) 0.03657 (2.8) 0.03657 (2.8) 
TREATMENT KERNEL   RADIUS NEIGHBOUR
 
SAMPLE 
ˆ T Cδ = −  TSTAT ˆ T Cδ = −  TSTAT ˆ T Cδ = −  TSTAT 
PANEL A: ( )ˆ 1it itrw w d< + , 0.03d =  Unmatched 36.95 (7.4) 36.95 (7.4) 36.95 (7.4) 
  ATT 0.02921 (2.5) 0.02201 (2.2) 0.04230 (2.9) 
PANEL B: ( )ˆ 1it itrw w d< + , 0.05d =  Unmatched  0.03648 (2.8) 0.03648 (2.8) 0.03648 (2.8) 
  ATT 0.03052 (2.6) 0.02227 (2.3) 0.04323 (1.9) 
PANEL C: ( )ˆ 1it itrw w d< + ,  0.10d = Unmatched  0.03595 (2.8) 0.03595 (2.8) 0.03595 (2.8) 
  ATT 0.03452 (2.8) 0.02667 (2.5) 0.05092 (2.3) 
PANEL D: ( )ˆ 1it itew w d< + , 0.03d =  Unmatched  0.11404 (9.2) 0.11404 (9.2) 0.11404 (9.2) 
  ATT 0.07089 (4.3) 0.07422 (4.7) 0.08598 (4.4) 
PANEL E: ( )ˆ 1it itew w d< + , 0.05d =  Unmatched  0.11304 (9.1) 0.11304 (9.1) 0.11304 (9.1) 
  ATT 0.06829 (4.2) 0.07036 (4.5) 0.06873 (3.6) 
PANEL F: ( )ˆ 1it itew w d< + ,  0.10d = Unmatched  0.11027 (8.9) 0.11027 (8.9) 0.11027 (8.9) 
 ATT  0.06443 (3.9) 0.06691 (4.2) 0.06277 (3.3) 
  ATT 30.09 (4.4) 31.41 (5.3) 33.84 (3.8) 
PANEL B: ( )ˆ 1it itrw w d< + , 0.05d =  Unmatched  37.67 (7.7) 37.67 (7.7) 37.67 (7.7) 
  ATT 29.55 (4.2) 32.11 (5.4) 37.11 (4.2) 
PANEL C: ( )ˆ 1it itrw w d< + ,  0.10d = Unmatched  37.92 (7.8) 37.92 (7.8) 37.92 (7.8) 
  ATT 28.99 (4.0) 30.29 (5.0) 33.23 (3.9) 
PANEL D: ( )ˆ 1it itew w d< + , 0.03d =  Unmatched  42.20 (8.8) 42.20 (8.8) 42.20 (8.8) 
  ATT 28.29 (4.8) 29.21 (5.1) 34.60 (5.3) 
PANEL E: ( )ˆ 1it itew w d< + , 0.05d =  Unmatched  42.21 (8.7) 42.21 (8.7) 42.21 (8.7) 
  ATT 27.56 (4.7) 29.86 (5.3) 29.02 (4.2) 
PANEL F: ( )ˆ 1it itew w d< + ,  0.10d = Unmatched  45.16 (9.6) 45.16 (9.6) 45.16 (9.6) 
  ATT 31.55 (5.5) 32.53 (5.8) 35.70 (5.5) 
Table 4: Propensity Score Matching Analysis – Employed at t+1 
 
Table 5: Propensity Score Matching Analysis – Wage (£) at t+1 
Table 6: Occupation Sought (t) by Actual Occupation Employed (t+1) 
OCCUPATION ACTUAL OCCUPATION AT t+1 ( )  1
a
itocc +
SOUGHT  AT t 
( sitocc ) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 55% 2% 9% 14% 2% 6% 11% 3% 0%
2 2% 36% 16% 16% 8% 8% 2% 6% 6%
3 11% 8% 34% 6% 13% 16% 8% 3% 3%
4 10% 2% 1% 52% 2% 8% 9% 8% 6%
5 4% 1% 2% 4% 67% 4% 2% 9% 6%
6 3% 0% 5% 3% 3% 62% 6% 2% 15%
7 6% 0% 4% 5% 7% 7% 57% 4% 10%
8 5% 0% 2% 5% 13% 5% 4% 61% 5%
9 4% 3% 5% 8% 7% 13% 7% 14% 39%
Notes: OCC 1-9 refers to occupations – (1) managers & administrators; (2) professional occupations; (3) associate professionals & 
technical occupations; (4) clerical & secretarial occupations; (5) craft & related occupations; (6) personal & protective service 
occupations; (7) sales occupations; (8) plant & machine operatives; and (9) other occupations. Calculations are based upon 
specifying an occupation at time t (i.e. occupation sought by those either unemployed or out of the labour market) and t+1 (i.e. 
occupation of subsequent employment). 
 
 
Table 7: Reservation, Expected and Predicted Wages and Occupational Attainment 
 OCCUPATION 
 
LOWER THAN PREDICTED: 
 1
a s
it itocc occ+ >
HIGHER THAN PREDICTED: 
 1
a s
it itocc occ+ <
PANEL A: ,  ( )ˆ 1it itrw w d< + 0.05d = 14.71% 16.52% 
ATT 17.58  (t=1.34) 41.17  (t=2.91) 
PANEL B: ,  ( )ˆ 1it itrw w d< + 0.10d = 13.63% 17.06% 
ATT 14.23  (t=0.32) 34.11  (t=2.36) 
PANEL C: ,  ( )ˆ 1it itew w d< + 0.05d = 13.09% 15.61% 
ATT 6.27  (t=0.75) 35.06  (t=2.56) 
PANEL D: ,  ( )ˆ 1it itew w d< + 0.05d = 12.91% 14.71% 
ATT 8.28  (t=0.71) 28.67  (t=2.04) 
Note: the treatment is defined as: ( ) ( )( )1 ˆ 1a sit it it itocc occ rw w d+ < × < +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  or ( ) ( )( )1 ˆ 1a sit it it itocc occ ew w d+ < × < +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . 
